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The Instituto de la Mujer in Spain 
Celia Valiente 
Government offices involved with the promotion of women's status 
arrived later in Spain than in other Westem countries. This late start 
was due to the fact that from the second half of the 1930s until1975 
Spain was govemed by a right-wing authoritarian regime that ac-
tively opposed the advancement of women's rights and status. Fur-
thermore, during the 19th and most of the 20th centuries, the feminist 
movement was weaker and its influence less noticeable in Spain than 
in other Westem democracies. Nevertheless, in 1994 the Instituto de la 
Mujer (1M) or the Woman's Institute, the main women's policy office 
at the national level, is comparable to agencies in other advanced 
industrial democracies in terms of goals, budget, and personnel. 
The Institute was founded in October 1983, six years after the first 
democratic elections were held in Spain and one year after the Partido 
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Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Socialist party) first carne to power. It 
remains an important site for women's policymaking within the 
Spanish state. The 1M differs from women's policy machinery in 
countries with stable democracies in three notable areas. First, the 
Institute is closely linked to one political party, the PSOE. This means 
that IM's top posts are filled mainly by Socialist party members or 
individuals who do not belong to any party. The Institute has not 
employed people who are active members of other political parties. 
This connection to the PSOE means that in the event that the Socialists 
lose control of parliament, the future of the 1M is uncertain. Second, 
like most bureaucratic agencies in the Spanish government, the 1M is 
primarily staffed by civil servants; few are former feminist activists. 
Third, there are no cooperative links, either formal or informal, be-
tween 1M femocrats and feminist activists.1 
This chapter will examine these three areas of contrast by discussing 
the establishment, organization and policy influence of the 1M, as well 
as its relations with women's groups and movements. 
Establishment 
Surveys suggest that Spanish citizens are more favorable to the state 
playing a major role in society than citizens of other postindustrial 
countries (Beltrán, 1990, pp. 318-319). For example, in 1988, 75% of 
those interviewed in Spain agreed with the statement "the state is 
responsible for all citizens and has to take care of all people who have 
problems,,,2 compared with 44% in France (in 1985) and 26% in the 
United States (in 1985). In Spain, only 23% of those interviewed agreed 
with the statement "citizens are responsible for their own welfare, and 
have to take care of themselves when they have problems," compared 
to figures of 49% in France, and 74% in the United States. This 
apparent characteristic of Spanish political culture may encourage the 
establishment of state institutions to help social groups, such as 
women, with a set of common pressing problems. 
This strong support for state intervention in Spain underscores the 
extent to which Spanish citizens have displayed a high level of sup-
port for the idea of women's policy offices, SUch as the 1M. For 
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instance, in July 1985, less than 2 years after the foundation of the 
Institute, 68% of Spanish women thought that the existence of a 
women's policy agency was very necessary or quite necessary, whereas 
7.9% thought it was scarcely or not necessary. About 5% of women 
chose the answer "it depends on what the institution does," and 18.8% 
chose the option "1 do not know /1 do not answer." Public opinion polls 
of women in December 1987 and of men and women in December 1988 
and December 1991 show that these views on the necessity of a women' s 
policy office have not varied (Instituto de la Mujer, Metra Seis). 
Spanish feminists did not make a strong unified call for the creation 
of women's equality institutions in the 19705 and early 1980s. Indeed, 
feminist attitudes about state institutions involving women's policy 
have varied widely. Sorne groups supported the establishment of the 
1M, arguing that the objective of a higher degree of formal and real 
gender-based equality could be attained through legal reforms and 
equality policies. According to this view, the state could be used to the 
advantage of women citizens if a significant number of committed 
feminists were well-established in key decision-making positions. 
Other feminists were very skeptical about the usefulness of such 
structures, believing that their effectiveness depended on many fac-
tors, such as the feminist commitment of the employees who would 
staff the new agency. These feminists neither completely supported 
nor opposed the creation of the 1M, choosing instead to wait until they 
could evaluate the Institute's performance after sorne years. A third 
group of feminists maintained that women should neither try to be 
equal to men nor attempt to achieve the same rights and status that 
male citizens already enjoyed. Rather, they argued that women should 
reorganize all aspects of public and private life in a new, nonhlerar-
chical formo Because these feminists saw the state as an institution that 
contributed to the perpetuation of the unequal relationship between 
women and men, they felt that the best strategy to follow was to stay 
as far away from the state as possible.3 
At least two contradicting factors have influenced these feminist 
evaluations of the usefulness of state institutions for women. On one 
hand, feminist groups that formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
were illegal and participated in the opposition to the authoritarian 
re gime (Scanlon, 1990, p. 94). To varying degrees, thls experience left 
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many feminists suspicious of political power. On the other hand, the 
PSOE was in power when the 1M was founded. Thus, for the first time 
since the 1930s, the government was in the hands of a party that 
overtly promoted the advancement of women's rights. Based on its 
goveming record under the Second Republic in the 1930s and its 
electoral platform in the 1980s, Spanish feminists were ready to give 
credence to the PSOE's cornmitment to women's rights.4 Besides, the 
feminism associated with the center in the 1920s and 1930s, liberal 
feminism, had disappeared during the dictatorship, so that most 
Spanish feminists carne from the Left (Threlfall, 1985, p. 47). 
A crucial ingredient in the establishment of the 1M was the PSOE's 
growing cornmitment to gender equality. This was not an easy pro-
cess, because the PSOE was a social democratic party. Like similar 
parties in other countries, the PSOE tended to be more concemed with 
class inequalities than with gender differences, and feminist activists 
were often contemptuously labeled bourgeois. Nonetheless, in 1976 a 
women' s caucus, Mujer y Socialismo, was formed and in 1981, a member 
of the caucus was elected to the PSOE's Executive Cornmittee, with 
others following her in successive years. In December 1984, party 
leaders decided to raise the women's caucus to the federal executive 
level, where it became the women's secretariat. The feminists in the 
secretariat successfully added clauses involving women's issues to 
PSOE congress resolutions, electoral programs, and other documents. 
These Socialist feminists also pushed for the inclusion of a women's 
policy office in the Socialist cabinet. 
In their attempts to cornmit the PSOE to state institutions for 
women' s policy, these feminist Socialists sought to create an office that 
would emulate the Socialist Ministry of Woman's Rights in France, 
which they perceived to be highly successful. They also used exam-
pIes of similar offices in other West European countries to reinforce 
their arguments for a women's policy agency with PSOE activists, 
elected officials, and bureaucrats, who were reticent about estab-
lishing such a bureau. As one director of the Institute said, this line of 
argument was particularly compelling in the context of the strong 
political support for integrating Spain into the group of economically 
developed and politically democratic countries. The nations Spain 
rushed to emulate had, for the most part, sorne form of government 
office for women's equality (personal cornmunication, Carlota Bustelo, 
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1M director from October 1983 to July 1988). Feminist socialists man-
aged to inc1ude a pledge lito create an equality commission guaran-
teeing nondiscrimination against one gender" in the PSOE's 1982 
electoral programo Right after the Socialist's electoral victory in 1982, 
Javier Solana, Minister of Culture, gave Carlota Bustelo, a well-known 
former PSOE deputy and feminist activist, the task of establishing the 
1M. The Act of October 24 (no. 16/83), 1983, formally set up the 1M. 
Organization 
The Instituto de la Mujer is not a ministry but an organismo autónomo 
(autonomous body) within the Ministry of Culture. Autonomy here 
does not mean independence from the political party in office, but 
autonomy from ministerial hierarchy. Unlike other departments, where 
there is an intermediate administrative layer between agency director 
and minister, the Institute's director is directly responsible to the 
minister. The IM's budget increased from $5 million to nearly $17 
million, or 325%, between 1984 and 1992.5 In the early 1990s, the 
Institute had a staff of more than 150 people; 182 in 1990, and 166 in 
1991 (Instituto de la Mujer, 1991, pp. 11-13; 1992, pp. 18-20). The 
internal organization of the 1M is as hierarchical as any other Spanish 
government office. Most of the staff are funcionarios (civil servants), 
differentiated by salaries and administrative grade. They have been 
recruited from within the bureaucracy. As with most c10sed systems 
of administration, entry into the civil service is determined by oposi-
ción (examination). Very few of the IM's staff were recruited because 
of their record in the feminist movement. 
The Spanish state is composed of offices (mainly ministries), each 
of which tries hard to preserve and augment its own powers. In this 
context, it is extremely difficult to create a new independent state 
organ to formulate and implement women's policies, which usually 
overlap with the competencies of several other state bodies. As a 
result, the 1M has neither the power nor the budget to formulate and 
implement most gender equality policies. Instead, it has to convince 
more powerful state offices, which usually have more resources, to 
elaborate women's equality policies. Aware of this dynamic, the first 
femocrats in the 1M structured the Institute to devote most of its 
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resources, time, and energy to forging and nurturing bonds with other 
state offices. 
Since 1985, the IM's director has been aided by the Consejo Rector 
(CR) or advisory council, which is primarily composed of repre-
sentatives from the major ministries. Until the late 1980s, a complete 
Consejo Rector met at least once every 6 months, and a reduced com-
mittee met at least once every quarter. The advisory council has the 
role of directly involving ministerial representatives in the formula-
tion, implementation, and evaluation of equality policies. Since this 
initial period of CR action, Convenios (cooperation agreements) be-
tween the 1M and the ministries have been signed, and the Consejo 
Rector has met only sporadically (personal communication, Purifica-
ción Gutiérrez, 1M director from April1991 to September 1993). 
The 1M originally was divided into three departments, which were 
expanded to four after 1989. A large part of one department, the 
Subdirección General de Cooperación y Difusión (Subdivision of Coopera-
tion and Publicity), is devoted to building and developing relationships 
with Comunidades Autónomas (regional govemments) and Ayuntamien-
tos (local councils).6 In general, the 1M has collaborated with sorne 
regional govemments in the creation of regional equality institutions 
and in the establishment and functioning of programs conceming 
women, for instance, refuges for battered women. The Institute has 
also helped local councils set up women's policy structures ·as well, 
but to a much lesser extent? 
The 1M was first attached to the Ministry of Culture and then moved 
to the Ministry of Social Affairs created in 1988. In comparison to other 
ministries, such as those of the Economy or the Presidency, both have 
a peripheral status in the state structure, a factor that helps to explain 
the marginalization of women's issues on the govemment's agenda. 
Since 1988, however, the Ministry of Social Affairs has been actively 
involved with advancing women's rights and status. Matilde Femán-
dez, minister of social affairs from 1988 to 1993, and Christina Alberdi, 
minister since 1993, dedicated much of their political activity prior to 
their appointments to feminist causes. As a result, they have been 
important in lending intergovernmentallegitimacy to the 1M. Both 
women have defended the issues and demands raised in the 1M and 
within feminist circles to the cabinet. Before 1988, in contrast, the 
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Institute depended on the minister of culture, Javier Solana, a man 
who displayed sympathy toward women's issues and respect for the 
1M' s autonomy but who had not been active in feminist groups or 
movements (personal communication, Carlota Bustelo, 1M director). 
Policy Influence 
The evaluation of the IM's influence in Spanish society is difficult 
because, in the context of its relatively recent creation, much of its 
political and social impact may not yet be detectable. Nonetheless, an 
examination of the extent to which the Institute has met the five major 
goals announced by its act of foundation and its regulations can shed 
sorne light on the IM's policy influence.8 
The first major objective was to promote policy initiatives for women 
through formal enactment of policy statements, such as legislation or 
decrees. In order to assess how far this goal has been achieved, it is 
important to bear in mind the legal status of Spanish women and the 
state of equality policies in 1983. In sorne respects, formal equality was 
already a reality in 1983 (Threlfall, 1985, pp. 60-61). For example, 
family law provided for joint administration of matrimonial property. 
In other areas, legal reforms had already been enacted and policies 
formulated, but their implementation was stHI incomplete in 1983. In 
1978, for instance, the advertising and selling of contraceptives was 
permitted, but their distribution through the National Health System 
was not organized. Still, in other areas of women's rights, there was 
still a great deal of progress to be made. Until1985, abortion was a 
crime punishable under the penal codeo 
Before 1987, 1M staff tried to promote and coordinate women's 
equality measures in different ministries through the meetings of the 
Consejo Rector. By 1987 it was clear to Carlota Bustelo, then Institute 
director, and other femocrats that different policy instruments were 
necessary to avoid the dilution of their efforts and to circumvent the 
unequal commitment of different ministries to gender-based equality. 
To address these problems the 1M designed a new instrument, the 
equality plan, which presented a list of goals for ministries to achieve 
within a specific time periodo The 1M staff prepared the first equality 
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plan in 1982, the Primer Plan para la Igualdad de Oportunidades de las 
Mujeres 1988-1990. It consisted of a comprehensive set of measures 
and reforms to be taken by 13 ministries, beginning in January 1988 
and ending in December 1990. Before presenting the, plan to the 
cabinet, the Institute negotiated its contents with most ministries, in 
order to sensitize the cabinet to the equality measures and to prevent 
the inclusion of specific items that would not be implemented by the 
ministries involved. 
Although it is difficult to summarize the contents of the 120 legal 
reforms and equality actions proposed by the Primer Plan, six different 
types of measures can be identified (1M, 1990, pp. 15-101): 
1. Legal reforms aimed at attaining equality between men and women 
before the law 
2. Initiatives for nonsexist education 
3. Equal employment mea sures 
4. Women-specific health programs 
5. The development of international cooperation projects related to 
women in other countries 
6. The promotion of feminist associations in Spain 
One of the main shortcomings of the plan was that, with the excep-
tion of legislative reforms, it was characterized by a high level of 
abstraction. For instance, Action 3.1.8 was "to carry out studies of 
female employers." Yet nothing was said about who was going to 
conduct such studies, how many were to be made, which institution 
was to pay for them, what their characteristics would be, and who 
should receive the results. 
When 1M staff carried out an evaluation of the implementation of 
the plan, they concluded that it was highly successful; out of the 120 
measures planned, 116 were taken (1M, 1990, p. 106). The IM/s conclu-
sion, however, must be considered with extreme caution. The vague 
nature of the original objectives makes it difficult to evaluate whether 
or not they have been achieved. AIso, the data and information that 
constitute the basis of this evaluation were provided by the responsi-
ble ministries themselves. This evaluation, therefore, may have over-
emphasized the positive aspects of their equality actions. A second 
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equality plan was drawn up for the period of 1993-1995 (1M, 1993). 
Like the first plan, it contains equality policies that are general and 
unelear. 
Despite the mixed review of the equality plans, femocrats in the 1M 
have been persistent and successful in engaging ministries in the 
formulation of some of these policies. Ultimately, of course, each 
ministry has the final word in deciding what those policies are. Even 
after a ministry has publiely cornmitted itself to foHowing a particular 
policy, the 1M has no power to penalize it for failure to fulfill its cornmit-
ment. Femocrats, in fact, have often succeeded in persuading other 
government agencies to act, but only to the extent that the decision 
makers have been willing to be persuaded. Still, if the 1M had not 
existed, it is unlikely that many ministries would have implemented 
the equality measures they have put into practice in the last decade. 
The second aim forwarded by the founding documents of the 
Institute was to study aH aspects of women's situation in Spain. This 
is an important task, because when the 1M was founded in 1983, little 
research of this type existed, particularly compared to the level of 
research on women's status in other advanced industrialized democ-
racies. One of the four main departments of the 1M, the Subdirección 
General de Estudios y Documentación, is devoted to the promotion of 
women's studies. The 1M has published books, given grants to re-
searchers, established awards and prizes for the best books and arti-
eles, cornmissioned pieces of research, and established a documenta-
tion center in Madrid to provide information to researchers and 
feminists. These activities have also contributed to promoting the 1M' s 
public image. Given that the 1M can organize these research activities 
independently without the approval of other ministries, this part of 
the Institute's mission is perhaps the most effective. 
The IM's third founding goal was to oversee the implementation of 
women's policies. It has been mainly through the Institute's legal 
department, Servicio de Informes Jurídicos, and the meetings of the 
Consejo Rector that this objective has been carried out. In the CR, 
ministry representatives have to report on the implementation of 
equality policies within their area of responsibility. The 1M, however, 
does not have any power to sanction a state body that fails to imple-
ment equality measures or that implements policies in an unsatisfac-
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tory manner. Possibly because of these limits, 1M staff have concen-
trated their efforts on other objectives they consider easier to achieve. 
Fourth, the 1M is responsible for receiving and handling denuncias, 
women's discrimination complaints. It can only provide legal infor-
mation to victims and initiate a legal complaint with the appropriate 
authorities when women victims come forward on their own. It can 
neither represent women in court nor lodge complaints without the 
victim's permission. The number of these complaints has been low: 
48 in 1986, 86 in 1987, 84 in 1988, 86 in 1989, 60 in 1990, 21 in 1991, 24 
in 1992, and 38 in 1993 (personal cornmunication, Charo Padilla, head 
of the 1M legal department). According to the 1M staff, this low rate is 
a result of many women's fear of taking legal action and a low level 
of awareness about women's rights (personal communieation, Charo 
Padilla and Cristina Blanca, head of the 1M information centers). 
The fifth major goal of the 1M was to increase women's knowledge of 
their rights. Middle-aged and elderly women were socialized at a time 
when qualities such as self-abnegation and saerifice were considered 
the greatest female virtues. The principal agents of this socialization were 
the Catholic church, official women's organizations of the authoritarian 
political regime, and traditional families. Many women of this genera-
tion, therefore, see themselves as bearers of obligations rather than 
citizens with rights. To achieve the goal of education, the 1M has set 
up centros de información de los derechos de la mujer (information centers) 
in a number of eities, where women can freely obtain information 
about their rights by inquiring in person, by phone, or by mail. In 1984 
there were 3 centers created, 4 in 1985, 10 in 1986 and since 1987, 1. In 
1991, the Institute established a toIl-free rights information phone num-
ber.9 Although the task is not impossible, it will take time to change 
weIl-established attitudes, especially among older generations. 
The 1M has only an indirect influence on policymaking; thus invest-
ing its resources in areas, such as research and dissemination of informa-
tion, over which it can exert the most influence. The Institute has won 
public support for these activities. In 1991, about 50% of the popula-
tion knew about the 1M, and a high proportion of those polled have 
consistently held favorable opinions of its performance. In 1985, 57% of 
women saw the work of the Institute in a positive light, and in 1991, when 
the survey was administered to both men and women, 78% of those 
surveyed gave the 1M a positive rating (1M, Metra Seis, 1985-1991). 
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The Spanish feminist movement has always been fragmented. Ac-
cording to 1M data, approximately 100 women's associations (not all 
of them feminist) exist at the nationallevel, and best estimates put 
their number throughout the country at around 3,000.10 For most 
feminists, this fragmentation is a rather positive feature of the move-
ment, because it reflects the diversity of women' s interests. In contrast, 
most femocrats see it as a problem that may hinder their collaboration 
with feminists, because the movement has not one, or a few, spokes-
people, but many. 
The Spanish feminist movement has been historically weak, with 
its activities only involving a minority of women. Durán and Gallego 
(1986, p. 205) estimate that by the mid 1980s the number of feminist 
activists accounted for less than 0.1 % of adult women. Recently, others 
have questioned the alleged weakness of the movement in Spain. 
Kaplan (1992, pp. 208-209) suggests that organizations with head-
quarters in Madrid and Barcelona show signs of strength and gives 
the example of national feminist conferences being regularly attended 
by between 3,000 and 5,000 women. Nonetheless, in comparison with 
other Westem countries, the movement in Spain has not achieved high 
visibility in the mass media or initiated many public debates. 
Generally speaking, informal relationships between 1M personnel 
and members of feminist organizations are weak. There are two 
reasons for this absence of stronger links. First, for the most part, 
Institute femocrats were not feminist activists before they entered the 
institutions. Second, many feminists, especially in the early 1980s, 
deeply mistrusted people who worked in state institutions, an atti-
tude that has since changed somewhat. Consequently, feminist access 
to 1M decision making was almost nonexistent before 1988 and is still 
extremely limited. For instance, although the Consejo Rector is sup-
posed to include six people who demonstrate a long commitment to 
gender equality, called vocales, they often have little contact with 
feminist groups. The Institute's director submits nominations to the 
parent minister, who officially approves them. These suggestions are 
based on individual career paths and not on any requisite amount of 
time spent in women's groups and/or feminist organization. 
232 COMPARATIVE STATE FEMINISM 
In 1988, the government formed a commission to monitor the 
implementation of the first equality plan. The Comisión consultiva para 
el seguimiento del Primer Plan para la Igualdad (CCPP) was exclusively 
composed of feminists and was supposed to provide femocrats with 
observations and recommendations for future plans. The CCPP could 
have been the beginning of a long-Iasting collaboration between 
femocrats and feminists, but the opportunity was apparently lost. 
Feminists bitterly complained that they were being asked to evaluate 
a plan they had had no role in preparing. The government did not ask 
the CCPP to participate in drawing up the second equality plan. 
Feminists also suspected that the 1M staff was not interested in their 
findings. Numerous disagreements arose among the feminists in-
volved, and sorne of them dropped out of the Commission before its 
works had been completed. 
After the Commission had finished its tasks in the early 1990s, the 
govemment invited three representatives of feminist organizations 
and representatives of the two major Spanish unions, Unión General 
de Trabajadores and Comisiones Obreras to serve on the Consejo Rector 
(IM, 1991, p. 143). These representatives are now the only formal 
channel Spanish feminists have to the IM's decision-making process. 
Paradoxically, they obtained this access at a time when the CR had 
virtually ceased to meet. This irony helps to explain why sorne femi-
nists question the desirability and usefulness of their participation in 
this body. 
Close informal relationships between 1M personnel and feminist 
organizations, combined with access to the Institute's decision-making 
process, might have reduced feminists' distrust of femocrats and 
encouraged at least sorne activists to focus their efforts on collabora-
tion with state institutions. Without these two conditions, many femi-
nists have opted to focus on protest-oriented activities and continue 
to maintain their distance from the women's policy offices, which 
appear to have no place for them. 
For their part, Institute femocrats explain that because the feminist 
movement is weak and the Spanish population rarely forms associa-
tions, the state should therefore promote the emergence of associa-
tions by providing them with subsidies and other types of support, 
such as space in its buildings, materials, information, and advice on 
organizing activities.ll Approximately 10% to 15% of the IM's budget 
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has been devoted to subsidizing women's (not necessarily feminist) 
organizations.12 It should be noted that subsidies of this type also exist 
in other countries, for instance France (Mazur, 1994, p. 30), the Neth-
erlands (Outshoom, 1994a, pp. 12-14), and Germany (Ferree, 1991-
1992). In the early years of the Institute, subsidies were given to 
associations without any criteria for the sort of activities to be orga-
nized. This changed in the late 1980s, when the 1M started subsidizing 
only programs strictly defined in accordance with the IM's priorities. 
Members of women' s groups hold different opinions about the 1M' s 
subsidies policy. Although sorne appreciate it, most feminists are 
deeply critical of the amount of support they receive from the Insti-
tute. Sorne argue that they do more for the improvement of the 
situation of women than do 1M femocrats, with their high salaries and 
prestigious and interesting posts. These feminists complain about the 
fact that most of the 1M budget is devoted to maintaining the institu-
tion (paying for salaries, office material, and ongoing expenses), rather 
than to promoting the activities of women's associations. Other activ-
ists think that many of these subsidies are given to organizations 
ideologically close to the PSOE, and not to those who work hardest 
for feminist causes. Still others think that the Institute is attacking 
feminist autonomy by imposing its own criteria about the type of 
projects feminist groups have to run in order to receive subsidies. 
Indeed, like the creation of the CCPP and the late feminist appoint-
ments to the CR, many critics see these subsidies as another "poisoned 
gift" from the 1M. Feminists also argue that because the bureaucrati-
zation of the process has increased greatly in the last few years, 
feminist groups are now required to spend a great deal of time on the 
formal procedures of applying for funds. 
Finally, sorne feminists suspect that subsidies might have served to 
coopt the movement by rewarding those organizations that support 
1M activities: It appears to them that the less an organization protests 
against 1M policies, the more subsidies it receives. In fact, the feminist 
movement is now less protest-oriented in Spain than it was in the 
1970s. This trend might have been reinfarced by the IM's palicy of 
subsidies, but other factors also influenced this tendency: the absence 
of unifying and mobilizing causes (with the main exceptions of abor-
tion and violence against women) and the recognition of the diversity 
of women's interests. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that one of the main achievements of the 
1M has been to involve other state bodies in making equality policíes. 
Generally, acceptance of these policies among politicians, cívil ser-
vants, and socíety is on the rise. And today Spanish femocrats face 
what Boneparth (1980) has called /lthe luxury of diffuse opposition" 
(p. 4), in that there has been no widespread conservative reaction to 
their initiatives. Indeed, there are few organized groups in state or 
socíety whose princípal objective is to limit or eradicate equality 
policíes and to retum women to their traditional roles. In part this 
could be due to the way in which the IM has initiated women's 
equality policies, by always seeking the cooperation of other political 
govemmental structures. As Rockman notes (1990, p. 37), this type 
of policymaking is certainly time and energy consuming. But once 
several actors have agreed on a particular policy, the support thus 
obtained makes the probability for success and acceptance much 
greater. 
The IM is linked to the PSOE in the sense that the Institute's staff 
generally accepts the official party position on women's issues. At the 
same time, the 1M does not favor the mobilization of the feminist 
movement (or of publíc opinion) as a way of advancing demands 
that go beyond PSOE gender equalíty compromises. For example, 
the IM has avoided the controversial abortion issue. The July 5,1985, 
Act (no. 9/1985) allows abortion only in three situations: when the 
woman has been raped, when pregnancy seriously endangers the life 
of the mother, and when the fetus is malformed. As such, it is one of 
the most restrictive laws in Europe. Although the majority of IM 
femocrats favor a more permissive abortion law, as of June 1994, 
femocrats have neither made public statements nor mobilized against 
the 19851aw. 
The IM has not been able or perhaps, willing, to break the traditional 
Spanish pattem of policy formulation and implementation, which 
affords social groups limited influence in the policy process (Valiente, 
1994). Indeed, the IM has appeared to cast its lot with the PSOE. In the 
event of a conservative party electoral victory, 1M femocrats' close ties 
to the ruling Socialist party and their distance from potential feminist 
support threaten the long-term future of the Instituto de la Mujer. 
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Notes 
1. The sources for this chapter include published and unpublished 1M docu-
ments, legislation, political party documents, press articles, and 31 in-depth per-
sonal interviews, conducted in 1993, with IM personnel, members of feminist 
organizations, and women's sections within trade unions, as well as with the 
Minister of Social Affairs. 
2. All translations are by the author. 
3. Information on the feminist movement carne from personal interviews with 
Cristina Garaizábal (Women Against Physical Abuse Group); Lourdes Hemández 
(Alliance of Women's Groups from Neighborhoods and Villages in Madrid); Lucía 
Mazarrasa (Forum of Feminist Politics)¡ Justa Montero (Pro-Abortion Commis-
sion); Ana M. Pérez del Campo (Separated and Divorced Women's Association); 
Empar Pineda (Lesbian Feminist Group); Isabel García-Pascual, M. Angeles de 
Lope, and Pilar Sauces (Free Women); María Jesús Vilches (Comisiones Obreras, a 
trade union); and Lucía Villegas and Carmen Muriana (Unión General de Traba-
jadores, a trade union). Those interviewed are not representative of the feminist 
movement as a whole but of sorne important currents within it. 
4. The first truly democratic regime was established in Spain during the Second 
Republic (1931-1936). Between 1931 and 1933, a coalition of Republican (liberal) 
parties and the PSOE govemed the country. Many legal reforms and policies for 
women were instituted then, including voting rights, the prohibition of discrimi-
nation, the establishment of divorce, the abolition of prostitution, and the organi-
zation of a matemity insurance scheme (Valiente, 1994, pp. 244-295). 
5. The 1M budget, in Spanish pesetas (U.S. dollars in parentheses) increased 
from 707.06 (5.2) million in 1984 to 2,297.4 (16.7) in 1992 (1M, 1992, pp. 36-40). The 
exchange rate on March 26,1994, was 137 pesetas for one dollar. 
6. Spain is a strongly decentralized state with 7 autonomous regions. 
7. This is a preliminary evaluation of the relations between the Institute and 
other women's agencies at the regional and locallevel, which needs to be comple-
mented by closer analyses of these territorial units. 
8. October 24, 1983 (no. 16/83) Act and Royal Decree August 1, 1984 (no. 1456/84). 
9. Women's rights information centers have responded to the following num-
ber of inquiries (personal communication, Cristina Blanca): 
Number Year 
18,891 1984 
31,685 1985 
50,164 1986 
45,730 1987 
57,633 1988 
60,701 1989 
65,583 1990 
55,366 1991 
58,469 1992 
52,812 1993 
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By the end of 1993, 160,435 calls had been answered. 
10. Information provided by Mar García and María Antonia Carretero, from the 
IM's Subdirección General de Cooperación. 
11. This is not a point of view particular to the IM's staff. It was also expressed 
by bureaucrats in the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
12. The amount of money spent in this way was as follows: 
Spanish 
Pesetas U.S. Dollars Percent of 
(in millions) (in millions) 1M Budget Year 
53.3 0.39 7.3 1985 
78.3 0.57 10.5 1986 
110 8.46 9.4 1987 
282.9 2.06 21.7 1988 
201.7 1.47 14.3 1989 
333 2.43 16.5 1990 
265 1.93 12.1 1991 
NOTE: Figures are from Instituto de la Mujer, 1992, p. 65, and 
percentages have been ca1culated from data contained on pp. 
36-40 and 68. 
